Distributed systems software can be difficult to test. The detailed behavior of such a system typically depends on the subtle timing of events and on the relative speed of executing concurrent processes. As a result, errors can be very hard to reproduce. When the system passes a series of tests, one cannot safely conclude that the same tests will never fail. The situation is further complicated when we deal with increasingly complex software with multiple feature packages, a phenomenon most PC users today are familiar with. The same problem exists in the systems code of large telephone switching systems.
Introduction
Distributed systems software can be difficult to test. The detailed behavior of such a system typically depends on the subtle timing of events and on the relative speed of executing concurrent processes. As a result, errors can be very hard to reproduce. When the system passes a series of tests, one cannot safely conclude that the same tests will never fail. The situation is further complicated when we deal with increasingly complex software with multiple feature packages, a phenomenon most PC users today are familiar with. The same problem exists in the systems code of large telephone switching systems.
The best-known manifestation of the problem in call-processing applications is the so-called feature interaction problem. 1 Telephone companies can compete with elaborate feature packages that are offered to customers, ranging from standard features such as call forwarding, to more obscure variations like call parking. The number of distinct features offered on a main switch today can be well over one hundred.
Each of these features can require a different response to the same basic set of events that can occur on a subscriber line, and thus the feature interaction problem is born. With just 25 features there can already be 2 25 possible feature combinations. If each combination could be tested in a second, it would take about a year to test all combinations. By any standard, this is an undesirable strategy. For a simple example of feature interaction, consider the required response of the switch if a customer has both anonymous call rejection and call forwarding features enabled simultaneously. Which of these two features should take precedence when an anonymous call arrives for this customer?
dence relation is prescribed that determines which feature behavior is to take precedence in case of conflict. (In the example above, for instance, the rules state that the anonymous call rejection feature should take precedence.) Unfortunately, the rules from the standards are not always complete, and they are sometimes ambiguous. The task of systematically checking whether the Telcordia standards have been implemented correctly by a vendor of a switching system therefore remains formidable.
Methods that can be used to mechanically verify distributed systems software should be of considerable value in industrial software design. We are interested here in methods that can be used to formally verify the call processing software and, specifically, the feature code for a new commercial switch. We will describe a system named FeaVer that can accomplish this feat.
Earlier attempts to apply automated verification techniques to distributed software applications generally have relied on handcrafted formal models. Often these models are produced by verification experts over a period of months in collaboration with the developers of an application. 3, 4 Because of the time required to construct formal models by hand, detailed changes in the application cannot be tracked easily without a significant reinvestment of time and energy. By eliminating the need for handcrafted models, the system we describe can be used to verify virtually every version of an application, tracking the evolving source throughout the design cycle.
In the next few sections we will discuss the central components of the FeaVer feature verification system:
• Mechanized model extraction-a method for mechanically extracting verification models from implementation level code, controlled by a user-defined conversion table.
• Property formulation-a definition of the set of formal requirements that the application has to satisfy. In our case many properties could be derived from the Telcordia standards for call processing feature implementation. Others define more specific local requirements or are more exploratory in nature. The use of a database of correctness properties is comparable to • Logic model checking-the method used to mechanically verify whether the system satisfies or can violate one or more of the stated requirements.
• System support-the mechanics of the verification process, including the use of a system of networked PCs, called TrailBlazer, to execute verification jobs in parallel.
We conclude the paper with a summary of our findings.
Mechanized Model Extraction
It is known that it is not possible to devise an algorithm that can prove arbitrary properties of arbitrary C or C++ programs. It is not even possible to mechanically prove a single specific property such as program termination for arbitrary programs. 5, 6 If we want to be able to render proofs, we have no choice but to restrict ourselves to a smaller class of programs. An example of such a class is the set of all finite state programsprograms that on any given input can generate only a finite number of possible program states (that is, memory configurations) when executed. We call a simplified program of this type a model. The set of all possible executions for a finite state model defines a finite directed, and possibly cyclic, graph. Even without explicitly constructing the complete graph, which can still be large, we can now reason about feasible and infeasible paths in the graph and determine whether certain executions are possible. This is precisely what a logic model checker is designed to do.
The first problem to be solved is to reduce a given C or C++ program to a meaningful finite state model that can be analyzed. The reduction will bring a loss of information, so it has to be chosen in such a way that relevant information is preserved and irrelevant detail is removed. What is "relevant" depends on the properties we are interested in proving about the program. For instance, if the functioning of the billing subsystem is not mentioned in any of the system requirements we check, then all access to and manipulation of billing data can be stripped from the program to produce the model. Some care has to be taken, though, to guarantee that the removal of code preserves our ability to find all property violations. The following procedure will ensure this.
All assignments and function calls tagged as irrelevant to the verification effort are replaced with a skip (a "dummy no-op" in the modeling language). All conditional choices that refer to data objects tagged as irrelevant are replaced by nondeterministic choices. Nondeterminism is a standard reduction technique used to make a model more general, broadening its scope. If nondeterminism applies, the model checker considers all outcomes of a choice equally possible, not just one specifically computed choice. The original computation of the system is preserved as one of the possible abstracted computations, and the scope of the verification is therefore not restricted. If no property violation exists in the reduced system, we can safely conclude that no property violation can exist in the original application.
The reduction method is "fail-safe" in a certain sense. If we chose the reduction incorrectly, the above result would still hold true, although the reverse would not. 710 It is possible, for instance, that the full expansion of an error trace for a property violation detected in the reduced system does not correspond to a valid execution of the original application. If this happens it constitutes a proof that information relevant to the verification was inadvertently stripped from the system. In this case at least one of the conditional choices in the abstract trace will turn out to be invalid in the concrete trace, not matching assignments to data objects earlier in the trace. These data objects are now known to be relevant to the properties being verified, and the reduction can be adjusted accordingly. Typically, a few iterations of this type suffice to converge on a stable definition of an abstraction that can be used to extract a verifiable model from a program text, as we will discuss in more detail below. 
The PathStar™ Code
The PathStar Access Server, 11 shown in Figure 1 , provides data and voice service over a variety of media. In examining the code for the PathStar Access Server, we focus exclusively on verifying telephony features. Since we are not looking for faults in the sequential code of device drivers, process schedulers, memory allocation routines, billing subsystems, and the like, the function of such code can be abstracted. In the case of device drivers, for instance, the abstractions used do not enable us to check that a device driver administers dial tone correctly when given the appropriate command by the controller. It does, however, enable us to check that the controller can only issue the appropriate commands when required and cannot fail to do so. 12 In the PathStar code the function of the controller is specified in a large routine that defines the central state machine for all basic call processing and feature behavior. This routine, roughly 1,600 lines of C source, is executed concurrently by a varying number of processes, jointly responsible for handling incoming and outgoing calls. In the extracted model for this code, we carefully preserve all concurrent behavior and the complete execution of the state machine, in slightly abstracted form.
Nondeterministic test drivers in the model are used to generalize the behavior of all parts of the system external to the state machine, such as the subscriber behavior, connected devices, and remote switches. The source text of the original program is preserved in the abstract model to enable us to easily reproduce a concrete trace from any abstract error trace discovered.
With the reduction process we have outlined, the control flow of the original source is preserved in the reduced model. Data access, however, passes through a user-defined abstraction filter. This filter is defined as a conversion lookup table. It determines which operations are irrelevant to the properties to be verified (such as function calls for billing and accounting) and which need to be represented either literally, with an equivalent representation in the language of the model checker, or in more abstract form. The irrelevant operations are mapped into the null operation of the model checker.
The Conversion Table
Of all the different types of statements that appear in the PathStar call processing code, about 60% are mapped to an equivalent statement in the extracted model (that is, they are preserved in the abstraction), shown in Table I . These include all statements that cause messages to be sent from one process to another (like call requests, call progress, and call termination signals) and all statements used to record or test the call state of a subscriber.
The remaining statements and conditionals are abstracted in one of three ways, depending on whether they are outside the scope of the verification, partially relevant, or fully relevant, as described below.
A statement entirely outside the scope of the verification is replaced with a skip and thereby stripped from the model, as discussed above. This applies to about 30% of the cases.
If a statement is partially relevant, the conversion Other examples of this type of abstraction are cases where the details of an operation are irrelevant, but the possible outcomes are not. For instance, digit analysis can be an involved operation that is mostly irrelevant to the functional correctness of the call processing code. The only relevant portion is that the controller deals correctly with the possible outcomes of this operation. The controller must respond properly when an abbreviated number or a feature access code is recognized, start routing the call if it is determined that sufficient digits were collected, or wait for the subscriber to provide more digits, with the proper timers set to guard the inter-digit timing interval. In this case the conversion table replaces the operation with a nondeterministic choice of the possible outcomes.
The third type of abstraction is used when an operation is fully relevant and needs to be preserved in the model, with only syntax adjustments.
To track changes in the source text and to retain the capability to extract models, we only have to keep the conversion table up to date, rather than maintaining a fully detailed handcrafted model. Some changes in the source require no update at all. This is the case, for instance, if code is copied or moved without introducing new types of data manipulation. When a new type of data access appears, the model extractor warns the user and prompts for a new entry in the conver-sion table. In most cases the new entry can be defined without knowing anything about the purpose of the change or its impact on behavior. Typically, a week's worth of upgrades of the call processing code translates into ten minutes of work on a revision of the conversion table before a fully mechanized verification of all properties can be repeated. We present more detail on the definition of conversion tables in earlier work.
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Assumptions About the Environment
The call processing code in the PathStar Access Server interacts with a number of entities in its environment, such as subscribers, remote switches, and database servers. The task of constructing detailed behavior definitions for each of these entities would be both formidable and redundant. 13 For each remote entity that interacts with the call processing controller, it suffices to construct a small abstract model that captures a conservative estimate of the possible behaviors of these entities in a general way. Note that our objective is not to verify the correct behavior of the remote entities, but that of our own switch, despite the presence of possibly ill-behaved remote entities. The system requirements, test drivers, and the conversion map together define the verification context, as illustrated in Figure 2 . The verification context consists of a conversion map that defines the level of abstraction, test drivers that capture the essential assumptions about the environment, and a database of properties that define the system requirements.
We can, for instance, define an abstract model for generic subscriber behavior with a simple demon. This type of demon can nondeterministically select an action from all the possible actions a subscriber might take at each point in a call, such as going on-hook or off-hook, flashing the hook, or dialing feature access codes. Similarly, we can model the possible responses from a remote switch to call requests from the local controller, using a demon that can generate possible responses nondeterministically.
Abstractions such as these, based on nondeterminism, achieve two objectives: They remove complexity by removing extraneous detail, and at the same time they broaden the scope of the verification by representing larger classes of possible behavior, instead of selected instances of specific behavior.
Conversion map/filter
Test drivers «^Mo del^« Requirements 
Formulating Properties
The database for feature verification of the PathStar code we have constructed contains approximately 80 properties for 20 features. For each feature set, the database further defines one or more provisioning constraints. When verifying the correct implementation of any given feature, we must, for instance, be able to specify that the feature is to be enabled and that incompatible features are to remain disabled. These additional constraints could be included in the definitions of the properties themselves, but the extra information would hamper their readability. By decoupling provisioning detail from functional properties, we can experiment more easily with different types of provisioning on a common set of properties. It is, for instance, possible to check the correct implementation of feature precedence relations by deliberately enabling and disabling higher precedence features. In the absence of an explicit provisioning constraint, the model checker will assume no knowledge about whether features are enabled or disabled, leaving this to nondeterministic choice.
For every feature, each property is verified for each related provisioning constraint. For 80 properties this translates, in our current database, into approximately 200 separate verification runs. The number of runs to be performed for a full verification of the source code can change with the addition or deletion of properties or provisioning constraints.
An Example
As a simple example we will consider the formalization of the requirement that when a non-ringing phone is picked up, dial tone is generated. Clearly, there are some exceptions to this rule. When the line is provisioned as a hotline, with a direct call feature, or when the line is provisioned with denial of the originating service feature, then no dial tone will be generated. To check this property, therefore, we need to define a provisioning constraint that disables such higher-priority features.
One method of specifying this property is to use a simple form of linear temporal logic. Temporal logic, introduced in the late 1970s for the concise formulation of correctness properties of concurrent systems, 14 defines a small number of operators that allow us to reason about executions. In temporal logic the example property can be specified as follows:
• (off-hook ^ X o (dial tone v on-hook)). In this case we allow for the possibility that the subscriber returns the phone on-hook before actually hearing the dial tone, which would of course be valid. The truth value of a temporal formula is evaluated over execution sequences, meaning that if we evaluate the formula at any given point in a system's execution it would be true if and only if the complete remainder of the execution from that point forward satisfies the property stated.
Three unary temporal operators are used in the formula above: • (always), X (next), and o (eventually).
• p states that p is true now and will remain invariantly true throughout the rest of the execution. X p states that p will be true after the next execution step. o p states that p is either true now or it will become true within a finite number of future execution steps. The right arrow, denotes logical implication. For example, (p ^ q) means (-p v q), where -is logical negation and v is logical or. The model checker uses this formula to check if there can be any system executions that would violate the property. This procedure works by first negating the formula, so that we get a formalization of a violating execution. The negated formula for the example can also be derived manually as follows, using standard rewrite rules from Boolean and temporal logic:
This negated formula can be converted mechanically 15 into a two-state v automaton, illustrated in Figure 3 , which is used in the model checking process. This automaton, described in Panel 2, is automatically extracted from a temporal logic formula. It defines the set of behaviors that would violate the property and is used in the verification process, much like a "pattern," to search the set of all possible system executions for matches.
Timeline Editor
To specify complex behavior, such as to capture the properties of a correctly functioning six-way conference call, an accurate formalization of the property in temporal logic can pose a challenge. We have therefore experimented with an alternative method for
Panel 2. Omega Automata
The formal definition of an ra automaton, as shown in Figure 3 , differs slightly from that of a standard finite automaton. Instead of accepting (input) sequences of finite length, like a standard finite automaton, an ra automaton accepts only sequences (in our case representing system executions) of infinite length. There are several ways to define the acceptance conditions for an ra automaton. 20 The definition used in SPIN is known as Büchi acceptance. It states that a sequence is accepted if and only if it visits at least one accepting state in the automaton (indicated with a double circle in Figure 3 ) infinitely often.
The property automaton in Figure 3 is also nondeterministic, which makes its behavior less obvious. In the model checking process, the transitions of this automaton are "matched" one by one against the execution steps of the system. Execution starts with the property automaton in its initial state s 0 . After each step in the system, the property automaton is forced to make a transition. To do so it can choose only from transitions with labels that evaluate to true at this point in the execution. The self-loop on s 0 in Figure 3 can always be traversed, since its label necessarily evaluates to true. The transition from s 0 to s, can only be taken when an off-hook event is detected. Note carefully that if an off-hook is detected, the property automaton can either stay in s 0 and ignore this event or move to s, and wait for a dial tone (that is, it makes a nondeterministic choice). The verifier will check the consequences of either choice. The latter is important because we want to make sure that every occurrence of an off-hook, notjust the first, is followed by a dial tone.
Once the property automaton reaches state s,, it can only remain there in the absence of dial tones and on-hooks. A sequence is formally accepted by the automaton if and only if it is possible for the property automaton to remain in s, forever, infinitely often traversing the selfloop on that state. If a dial tone is detected within a finite number of steps, the attempt to match the corresponding execution to the property automaton fails, which means that the execution satisfies the original requirement and does not constitute a violation. The matching process stops at this point. The model checker will abandon the search of this execution and explore other possible executions instead, in a hunt for possible violations. There need not be a back-edge from state s, to state s 0 , since all behaviors of interest are already captured by the nondeterminism on s 0 (see above).
specifying properties, which employs a simple graphical user interface. Although this form of property specification is not as general as a formalization in temporal logic, it covers many of the types of properties we are interested in. All properties specified in this way can be translated mechanically into temporal logic formulas or also directly into property automata for use in the model checking process. Figure 4 shows the specification of the earlier property, checking for dial tone after an off-hook.
The timeline editor in Figure 4 provides an intuitive alternative method for property specification. It allows the user to define events that are part of the required behavior on a horizontal line. Most events are markers used to identify the execution sequences of interest. The user also defines a test target and marks multiple, possibly overlapping, intervals with constraints. The events are labeled with an e in the diagram. Other events are required to appear in response to the earlier ones. These are marked with an r (not shown in Figure 4 ). The last event of the sequence is always required and is marked with a t (for target). The model checker will flag an error if it can construct an execution sequence in which the markers (e) are present, but one or more of the required events (r and t) are missing.
The timeline editor also allows us to state that certain events must be absent for the execution to be of interest. In this case, it applies to on-hook events. These conditions are specified as constraints on the execution, using a horizontal bar under the timeline to identify the precise part of the execution to which the constraint applies. For events or conditions not mentioned as events or in constraints, no restrictions apply. The property definition shown in Figure 4 is automatically converted into the same automaton as shown in Figure 3 , so the two methods of specification yield identical checks in this case.
Logic Model Checking
The formal models extracted from the source of the application are specified in the language of the linear temporal logic model checker SPIN. 13 SPIN models define the behavior of systems of asynchronous processes that can communicate via message channels, rendezvous ports, or shared data. SPIN converts the input specification into a product of automata. The global behavior defined by this product can be checked efficiently for a wide range of correctness properties using an automata theoretic model checking procedure, first described by Vardi and Wolper. 16 To perform the check, SPIN starts by computing an automaton that captures all possible violations of a given correctness property. If the property is specified as a formula in linear temporal logic, 14 for instance, SPIN takes the logical negation of the formula and converts it into a test automaton using a standard procedure. 15 This automaton formalizes system executions that should not be feasible if the application is designed correctly. Next SPIN searches the intersection product of the language defined by the negated property automaton and the language defined by the automata that were extracted from the system. If the intersection product is empty, no violations of the property are possible and the system passes the test. If the intersection product is not empty, it contains at least one complete execution that is both in the language of the system (that is, a possible execution of the system as specified) and in the language of the negated property (that is, constitutes the violation of a property). In this case SPIN will generate such an execution sequence as proof that the property can be violated. In the FeaVer system the sequence is converted back into the source language of the application, employing a reverse lookup in the table that was used to extract the formal model from the source of the application. The verification process is illustrated in Figure 5 . 
System Support: TrailBlazer
The main interface to the feature verification system is a standard Web browser. The browser enables the user to check on the verification status of all properties, look up the text and the justification of each property, refer to the source text of the Telcordia feature requirement documents, and inspect reported error sequences in a number of different formats. An error sequence can be displayed as:
• A message sequence chart in either ASCII or graphical form (as shown in Figure 6 ), or • A detailed dump of a series of concurrent execution traces interleaved in time, with one trace for each process that participated in the failed execution. The detailed execution traces list all concrete C statements and conditions that are executed or evaluated during the execution, in time sequence. Typically, such a sequence reveals subtle race conditions in the interleaving of actions that can lead to faults.
A sample execution sequence, shown in Figure 6 in graphical form as a message sequence chart, is presented by the verification system as proof that executions are possible in which dial tone is not generated. In this case the property violation can occur if the subscriber has call forwarding and happens to pick up the phone precisely when an incoming call is being forwarded. In an unlikely scenario, the call processing software can be made to delay the generation of dial tone arbitrarily long while the system is rejecting or forwarding more incoming calls. When the calls stop, the system will eventually time out and deliver dial tone (not shown here). The scenario can also be presented as a trace of C statement executions.
The main pieces of the infrastructure for the checking process-the test drivers, the conversion lookup table, and the supporting text for propertiesare created and maintained with a standard text editor. The source code of the application is maintained by the developers and parsed directly by the FeaVer software when a verification run is initiated.
Currently, verification runs are always initiated by the user through the Web interface. It would also be possible to automatically trigger a comprehensive series of checks each time the FeaVer system detects that either the source of the application or the text of a property has changed, say in the early morning hours of every day. So far, however, we have not implemented this intriguing possibility.
To initiate a check, the user selects one or more properties and provisioning constraints from the Web interface and initiates the check with the click of a button. The remainder of this section describes what happens when the button is pushed. The tasks to be performed in the verification process are divided among a number of server applications that can run anywhere in the network. This capability to spread the work among several machines allows us to exploit large numbers of independent processors to assist in the execution of verification tasks. The additional processors are not necessary to enable FeaVer to perform its tasks, but they can speed up the process significantly. The network of processors we have assembled for this purpose, called TrailBlazer, is described in detail later in this section. Together, four basic types of servers-tb_prep, tb_sched, tb_exec, and tb_wrap-provide the required functionality, as illustrated in Figure 7 and explained in more detail below.
When the user presses the "check" button on the Web browser, a sequence of steps is executed to mechanically verify the properties selected. Negative results of the verification typically flow back to the user within minutes after a check is initiated.
The verification system performs the following steps: 1. The FeaVer Web browser sends a request to initiate one or more verification runs to a server called tb_prep. This server receives the property and provisioning information the user provides and starts the process. It calls a program to parse the C code of the application, identify the state routine, and convert it into a SPIN verification model using the conversion map. The system adds the user-defined test drivers (defining context), suitably translated provisioning information, and the property, after converting it into automata form. On average there are two local states in the SPIN model for every line of source code in the application. The final model defines the behavior of 7 different types of processes (several of which are used to create multiple independent processing threads), 10 buffered message channels, and about 100 variables. The model is constructed in less than a second.
Tb_prep also generates a script that can be used to generate C code for a dedicated verifier for the model that was produced and to compile and run that code. It now hands over the task to a central task scheduling server, tb_sched, by sending it a to the job file. 2. Tb_sched collects the information and adds it to its table of tasks to be completed. This server also collects offers to execute jobs from arbitrary workstations in our network. To make such an offer, the workstation runs a small server program called tb_exec. The volunteering workstation can run any type of operating system. The FeaVer servers, for instance, run under Windows NT.* Fifteen dedicated PCs act as compute-servers running under the Plan 9 operating system. 17 These PCs, shown in Figure 8 , are permanently allocated to run verification jobs and to give the TrailBlazer system a performance boost.
3. When the scheduler tb_sched identifies an available workstation, it sends the corresponding server tb_exec a job script, with details on where any dependent information (such as files to be compiled) can be retrieved. The scheduler will attempt to have as many tasks as possible performed in parallel, without overloading any one of the workstations. Typically, no new job is assigned to a workstation until the previous one has been completed. The search itself is performed with an iterative search procedure that optimizes the chances of finding errors quickly (see Panel 3).
4. When a workstation completes a task, it signals its renewed availability to the scheduler, tb_sched, and forwards the results of the run to the last server on the FeaVer system. That server, known as tb_wrap, performs postprocessing. 5. Tb_wrap produces the ASCII and graphical format for error sequences and generates detailed C traces. If no error is found, some statistics on the run are collected, to allow the user to judge the validity of the result (as described in the section "Avoiding False Positives," below). The statistics include the coverage of the property automaton and the coverage of the model code as a whole. The information is entered in the data- base and linked to the corresponding properties, to make it accessible to the user via the Web browser interface.
Tracking Progress
When a comprehensive verification cycle is started for all properties that have been defined-for instance after an update of the source text of the application-it is useful to know immediately when an error sequence for a property has been discovered, so that it may be inspected. Typically this happens within the first few minutes of a comprehensive run, but it is of course not known in advance which properties might fail. The job scheduler, tb_sched, knows when the processing of an error sequence was completed. Through the standard Web browser it can then prompt the user, pointing at a URL where detailed information on the error sequence can be found. A
Panel 3. Iterative Search Procedure
SPIN provides support for performing verification jobs either exactly or with varying degrees of precision, using proof approximation techniques. The benefit of an exact run is clear. An exact verification, however, can be time consuming for larger problems. An approximate answer that can be delivered quickly is often of more value to a user than a precise answer that takes much longer to compute. In an approximate verification both the quality and speed of the run can be controlled with a parameter. As the thoroughness of the run increases or decreases, so do the time requirements. An approximate verification in effect performs a random sampling of the behavior of a system, in an effort to find violations of system requirements. With this technique we can find a practical compromise between verification and testing. The coverage achieved in even approximate verification runs is significantly larger than what is achievable with traditional testing techniques. In our experience, when property violations are possible, they can be identified even in very approximate verification runs. The verification system uses this fact to enforce an iterative search refinement method for each verification task. The iterative search procedure starts by allocating the fastest possible, and most approximate, runs for each task. The first of these runs typically completes in under a second of CPU time. If an error is found during a run, the remainder of the runs can be abandoned, and the error sequence can be processed for inclusion in the FeaVer database. If no error is found, the coverage is increased. The second run may take 2 seconds, proceeding to 4-, 8-, and 16-second runs-and so on-until either an error is found or maximal coverage is reached (and with that, proof that no violations of the corresponding property are possible). With, say, 200 verification runs to be performed and 20 workstations available to perform the runs, the first approximate runs can be completed in about 10 seconds for alljobs combined. In each new iteration alljobs that produced errors are deleted from the work set, and the scan becomes more thorough for the remaining properties. Typically, this procedure makes it possible to identify the first property violation in a large set of verification tasks within a few minutes . After about 5 minutes, a representative selection of violations is normally available, with the gaps filled in subsequent searches. The iterative search procedure is abandoned after about an hour, whether it has produced exhaustive results or not. The rationale is that, normally, within an hour the programmer will have looked at the property violations and formulated corrections of the source code. Further error sequences would be of little use, since the source code has by now changed, and more value can be derived from a new scan of all properties for the new version of the source. Once all verification tasks have been completed, an optional second phase of the verification is performed by reinspecting every error sequence found and, again iteratively, searching for a shorter equivalent (see also "Assessment").
visual tracker, written in Tcl/Tk, 18 uses color barsone for each property being verified-to show the progress of the search. The bar turns red as soon as an error sequence has been discovered for the corresponding property. By clicking the bar, the detailed information on the sequence can be brought up in a Web browser.
This tracking application is illustrated in Figure 9 . In the figure, a list of all properties included in the current verification run is displayed at the left. As many as eight cycles in the iterative search refinement process are executed. The search stops, marking the progress line in red, as soon as an error is found.
Separately, another small Tcl/Tk application can be used to track the actions of the scheduler. It shows which machines have volunteered to execute jobs, which have been assigned a job, and what the job details are, as illustrated in Figure 10 .
A color code identifies which of these workstations are currently free (green), which are busy (blue or yellow), and which are dead (red). To the right of busy workstations is briefly indicated which job they are currently executing-a compilation (yellow) or a verification (blue). 
Avoiding False Positives
From the point of view of the verification system, the best possible outcome of a verification attempt is the generation of an error sequence. If the abstraction in the conversion table was chosen incorrectly, there is a possibility that the sequence is invalid and constitutes what is called a false negative. This can usually be determined quickly by inspecting the sequence, and the abstraction can be adjusted to prevent recurrences. An absence of errors may indicate that the application faithfully satisfies the property, but in this case it is possible that the property itself was in fact inadequate. This is called a vacuous property, or false positive. 19 Consider a property of the type we discussed earlier:
• (p ^ X (o q)). It states that whenever a trigger condition p occurs, then sometime thereafter-within a finite number of execution steps-a response q will follow. This response q can either be a proper response or a dis-charge condition that voids the need for a response (such as an on-hook event that voids the need for a dial tone signal). If all is well, there will be executions in which p occurs at least once. If there are no executions possible in which p occurs, then the formula is logically satisfied (note that the condition • (p^q) is satisfied when p is invariantly false). Even though the formula is satisfied, it is almost certainly not what the user intended. The telltale sign of this false positive can be found in the number of states reached during the check for the automaton that corresponds to this property. In the case above, the property automaton never leaves its initial state. This occurrence can easily, and mechanically, be detected so the user can be warned to change the formulation of the property into a more meaningful one.
Because properties that do not generate error sequences can take the longest time to fully check (that is, they will pass through all iterative passes of the scheduler), the user can ask the scheduler to provide statistics on the runs that have been completed for a property. If the first few approximate runs for a property leave the property automaton in its initial state, strong evidence that the property is void can be available within the first few minutes of the verification. In this case, it is not necessary for the user to wait for the complete verification process to terminate.
Assessment
By concentrating on the central portion of the control code for call processing in the PathStar Access Server, we were able to perform unusually thorough checks of critical system properties. This narrow focus, however, also pushed some interesting types of properties beyond our reach. The main burden on the user of this checking process is defining meaningful properties, not determining the mechanics of the checking process itself. The use of temporal logic can be a stumbling block, even for experienced users. To try to remedy this, we developed the simple timeline editor, which is able to express the majority of the properties of interest in a fairly intuitive way. The vacuity check on apparently positive results from a verification run has also proved to be essential: it can be easy to state complex properties that are in retrospect meaningless. We built some mechanized checks to warn the user of such occurrences.
In a production environment, with its strict project deadlines, the likelihood that a system error will be addressed quickly is often inversely proportional to the amount of text needed to describe it. Execution sequences of thousands of steps that putatively violate complex logic properties are not likely to get quick attention. We therefore use the verification system in two phases. The first phase identifies all possible property violations, and the second phase generates the shortest possible example of each violation discovered, selecting the most likely manifestation of the error. This strategy has proven successful. In most cases an error can be demonstrated in no more than ten to fifteen steps, whereas an initial error sequence might contain hundreds of steps.
Conclusions
At the time of this writing, we had tracked the design, evolution, and maintenance of the PathStar call processing code for approximately 18 months. During this timeframe, the code grew five-fold in size and went through roughly 300 different versions, often changing daily. We intercepted approximately 75 errors in the implementation of the feature code by repeated verifications. Many of these errors were considered critical by the programmers, especially in the early phases of the design. About 5 of the errors caught were also found independently by the normal system test group, especially in later phases of the project. (The traditional testing, of course, addressed the PathStar system as a whole and did not concentrate solely on the call processing code, as we did.) In about five other cases the testers discovered an error that should have been within the domain of our verifications. These missed errors were caused by unstated or ambiguous system requirements; once the proper requirements were added into our database, the violations were caught.
Flaws can be introduced accidentally into source code not only in the initial design stages, but also-and perhaps more frequently-during routine system maintenance. A notable portion of routine bug fixes will introduce new bugs into the code. The ability of the FeaVer system to repeat comprehensive verification runs immediately after a bug fix is attempted is therefore of great value. New property violations can be trapped instantly, while the rationale for a code change is still fresh in the mind of the developer.
In several cases we used our verification system in an unexpected way-as a diagnostic tool. Occasionally the testers would run into a problem that could not be reproduced. By feeding the event sequence of such a test into the FeaVer system, the error sequence could be reproduced and studied to determine which race conditions or event timings were responsible for its occurrence. In other cases the programmers of the system wanted to confirm their intuition about the occurrence or absence of certain conditions, such as a suspected unreachability of part of the code. The verification framework proved ideal to settle such questions promptly.
The method of verification we have outlined in this paper should be generally applicable to distributed systems code written in most programming languages. Our aim in the coming years is to apply the method to a diverse set of applications in order to streamline the checking process and make it available for general use.
